Educational backgrounds correlate with Islamic trends in Nigeria, which changed in significant ways during the 1980s and 1990s. Analysis of Islamic movements must pay attention not only to differences but also linkages and changes within and among Islamic trends.

Education and Islamic Trends in Northern Nigeria: 1970s–1990s

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Recognizably different Islamic trends in contemporary Northern Nigeria can be described in terms of traditionalism, modernism, and fundamentalism, and each trend can be correlated to a different educational background as well as a different political orientation. Within the last two decades, each of these trends has changed, with traditionalism shifting toward modernism, and modernism becoming fundamentalism, while fundamentalism faces imminent transformation in uncertain directions. Although handy for analyzing different trends, traditionalism, modernism, and fundamentalism should be recognized as discursive categories that are capable of not only revealing but also erasing subtleties, linkages and nuances of constantly changing social movements.

Introduction

The political implications of Islamic sectarianism have dominated the recent literature on Islam on contemporary Nigeria (Anwar 1992; Umar 1993; Kane 1994; Loimeier 1997). The long-term consequences of Islamic reforms of the 1970s and 1980s have not yet been studied. This essay explores some of these long-term consequences by analyzing Islamic trends of traditionalism, modernism, and fundamentalism, and correlating each with different educational background. It argues that since observable changes over the last three decades indicate that these trends are not mutually exclusive, the terms *traditionalism, modernism,* and *fundamentalism* must be interrogated and reevaluated.

Islamic Traditionalism

Nigerian *'ulamā'* (Islamic religious scholars) represent an Islamic trend that can be termed "Islamic traditionalism" without necessarily implying a changeless essentialism. The traditionalism of the Nigerian *'ulamā'*

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articulates a conception of Islam identical with the "great tradition" of Islam: officiating in Islamic public rituals, instructing Muslims in Islamic precepts, and interpreting and administering Islamic law. Thus consistent with the norm in Islamic societies globally (Cohen 1970; Gilbert 1980), Nigerian *ulamā* preoccupy themselves with the broad ideological parameters of Islamic societies especially in the religious, educational, and legal domains.

As in other Islamic societies, Nigerian *ulamā* have also been part of the ruling elite, serving as judges, ministers, scribes, and counselors to rulers. The historical integration of the *ulamā* into the ruling elite—perhaps best exemplified in the *ilmīye* of the Ottoman Empire (Shaw 1976; Ugur 1986)—has historically been characterized by a tension dividing the *ulamā* into two opposing political orientations. While some *ulamā* belong to the ruling elite, labeled polemically *ulamā al-sū* (venal scholars), other *ulamā* preferred to keep distance from the political arena, claiming the self-righteous name of *ulamā al-sunna* (righteous scholars) (Madelung 1980; Marlow 1995). In his analysis of the orientations of *ulamā* toward politics, Bernard Lewis (1986) identifies one orientation as "quietist" because it views tyranny as a lesser evil than anarchy, and stresses obedience even to a tyrannical ruler in order to preserve Islamic public order. Lewis describes the other orientation as "activist" because it emphasizes that absolute obedience is due to God alone, and if a ruler becomes sinful he should not be obeyed. An appreciation of how these opposing orientations evolved in Northern Nigeria, and the broader West African context, is important for understanding the contemporary Islamic traditionalism of Nigerian *ulamā*.

Historians of Islam in West Africa identify "Suwarian tradition" with quietism and "Maghilian tradition" with activism (Hiskett 1962; Wilks 1968; Batran 1973; Sanneh 1976; Levtzion 1978; Hunwick 1986). The jihad movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries brought activist *ulamā* into power as rulers rather than merely ministers and advisers. This development reversed the equation between "righteous scholars" and "venal scholars." Thus before the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate between 1804 and 1810—the Islamic polity that ruled Northern Nigeria until replaced by the British colonialists in 1903—the "righteous scholars" were those who kept distance from the rulers of the Hausa states, while the "venal scholars" were those who worked for these rulers. This distinction was reversed after "the righteous scholars" became the rulers of the Sokoto Caliphate, yet *ulamā* continue to exhibit both "quietism" and "activism" (Hiskett 1973; Jalingo 1982–1985) even after colonialism transforms Islamic traditionalism in a manner comparable to the changing roles of *ulamā* globally (Keddie 1972). But first, what is the educational background of Nigerian *ulamā*'s?

Traditional Islamic Education

Nigerian ʿulamāʾ are trained in the traditional Islamic educational system, which comprises two tracks that originated from the precolonial period (Fafunwa 1991). The first tract is *makarantar allo* (Qur'anic school) that forms primary level in traditional Islamic education, focusing on Arabic literacy and memorizing the Qur'an. Those able to successfully memorize the entire Qur'an become professional reciters, Qur'anic teachers, scribes, and copyists. Lubeck (1985) observes that graduates of *makarantar allo* were members of the Maitatsine "sect" that led a series of religious uprisings in the 1980s, thus highlighting the connection between particular Islamic trends with specific educational backgrounds. Not all graduates of *makarantar allo* join the Maitatsine sect or become professional Qur'an reciters. Most Muslims will memorize only enough Qur'an for their own devotional use. A choice of a different Islamic scholarship takes one to *makarantar ilimi* (knowledge school).

Whereas *makarantar allo* begins from early childhood and usually terminates by adolescence, the *makarantar ilimi* does not start before adolescence and often lasts for the entire life of most students, but some may abandon the intellectual pursuits or at some stage become learned enough to be recognized as teachers. The curriculum in *makarantar ilmi* includes Arabic Language and Literature, Islamic Law, Theology and Logic, Qur'anic Exegesis, Traditions of Muhammad, Islamic History and Local Histories (Oseni 1999). Graduates of *makarantar ilimi* and those of Qur'anic schools constitute the *mallam* class, the Hausa word for ʿulamāʾ (Abubakar 1972; Hiskett 1976; Tahir 1978; Galadanci 1982; Fafunwa 1991).

Nigerian ʿulamāʾ have historically enjoyed considerable influence and social prestige. They traveled widely in search of specialized teachers and clientele, and formed a notable part of trading stations all over West Africa (*zangos*), serving as teachers, letter-writers, legal-draftsmen and notary public, record-keepers, and of course as religious specialists (Adamu 1978). Similarly, only ʿulamāʾ could hold certain governmental positions in the precolonial era, including *wazīr* (prime minister and legal adviser to the Emir), *alKali* (Hausa for *qāḍī*, judge) of the sharīʿah courts, and *imām* (leader of Islamic congregational devotion). But consistent with the norm in Islamic societies, some ʿulamāʾ avoided governmental positions and preferred to teach private circles of disciples, especially during the colonial period 1903–1960.

The British introduced western education during the 1910s and 1920s, a development that undermined ʿulamāʾ's monopoly over literacy and access to positions, resources, and prestige. Early in the colonial period, British authorities found that ʿulamāʾ could play crucial roles in establishing colonial administrative infrastructures especially in judicial and educational domains, and recruited the ʿulamāʾ as local historians, translators, and "native anthropologists" who provided data for compiling district gazetteers used to acquaint new colonial administrators with the history and cultural

traditions of the communities they were to administer (Kirk-Greene 1972). Yet even as the colonial administration employed the *ulamā*, colonialism introduced alternatives to their skills through western education. When the first generation of western-educated Muslims inherited power at independence in 1960, the influence of *ulamā* began to change.

Changes in the Traditionalism of Nigerian *Ulamā*

One notable change in the traditional roles of Nigerian *ulamā* originating from the colonial period is the transformation of Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya Sufi orders. John Paden's pioneer study (1973) documents significant changes in the revival of these Sufi orders that peaked between the 1940s and 1960s and declined significantly thereafter. The late 1970s saw both Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya staging comebacks in reaction to Islamic modernism (Umar 1993, 1995). A key feature of this comeback is the successful transformation of Sufi orders to function effectively as civil associations that aggregate, articulate, and promote both the religious and material interests of their leaders and members (Loimeier 1997). Their continuing operation across borders of modern nation-states has kept the linkage of Nigerian *ulamā* to global currents of Islamic traditionalism (Kane 1997). It is, however, important to note that Sufi orders do not seek to limit arbitrary exercise of state power—a prominent feature of the liberal conception of civil society. In fact, Nigerian *ulamā* are not averse to influencing state coercive agencies against rival Islamic trends or seeking rents from state economic enterprises. While it is debatable whether or not the Sufi orders are becoming a part of a civil society, it seems clear that their changing roles and orientations represent a notable change in the traditionalism of Nigerian *ulamā*.

A dramatic change within Islamic traditionalism is the series of Maitatsine uprisings that first erupted in December 1980, resulting in the colossal destruction of thousands of human lives (4,177 dead according to official figures) and property of yet undetermined value. Similar major Maitatsine uprisings recurred at Bulunkutu–Maiduguri and Rigassa–Kaduna in October 1982, Yola–Jemeta in February 1984, and Gombe in 1985. Muslims do not want to identify Maitatsine as one of the *ulamā*. It cannot, however, be disputed that Maitatsine and his followers emerged from Qur'anic schools that form the primary level of traditional Islamic education in Nigeria.

Scholars account for Maitatsine uprisings in term of adverse economic conditions that have continued to deteriorate since the 1970s, when rampant graft had already began to destroy the Nigerian economy (Christelow 1985; Hiskett 1987; Isichei 1987). Paul Lubeck argues that "It is impossible to understand urban social life, the *gardawa* [i.e., graduates of Qur'anic schools] or most importantly, the Yan Tatsine in Kano without taking into account the articulation of capitalist and precapitalist institutions" (Lubeck 1985: 369–89). More recently, Michael Watts (1996) explains Maitatsine uprisings in terms of an Islamic civil society rejecting capitalist development while coping with issues of modernization. Although Maitatsine uprisings severely tested the security apparatus of the Nigerian State, it is impera-

tive to realize that the Maitatsine "movement" hardly represents a civic association seeking to limit hegemony of the Nigerian state; it is also important not to lose sight of the spontaneous character of Maitatsine uprisings. To understand Maitatsine as part of the changing traditionalism of Nigerian 'ulamā,' one needs to appreciate that the agrarian social infrastructure that used to give relevance to their Qur'anic education had been significantly altered by transformations of Nigerian society and economy during the oil boom of 1970s. Seen in this light, Maitatsine uprisings represent a violent protest against the larger societal transformation that had forced changes in 'ulamā''s traditionalism.

New associations formed and led by 'ulamā' represent a development in civil society more clearly. Among these associations, the "more powerful . . . was the organization named Fityan al-Islam," initially founded in 1963 to counteract the emergence of the "heretical" Ahmadiyya movement in Kano (Loimeier 1997: 44). Fityan al-Islam grew steadily through numerous branches that promoted 'ulamā''s agenda, including opposition to Islamic modernism. Loimeier summarizes the expansion of this association thus: "In 1989 the Fityan al-Islam had branches in fourteen out of twenty-one federal states. Membership dues, contributions, and donations financed the movement. In 1972 the first modern Islamiyya school of the Fityan was ready to open, and by 1983 the organization controlled 183 schools with 985 classes and 11,835 students in Kano alone. In 1983 the Fityan al-Islam were in control of 894 mosques in the whole of Northern Nigeria" (Loimeier 1997: 77). More recently, the general secretary of Fityan al-Islam, Bashir Babura (2000), reckons that since its inception in 1963 Fityan al-Islam had converted 105,494 individuals to Islam, and established 1,697 branches, 2,881 Islamiyya schools with 302,514 students. A significant point worth emphasizing here is the modern organizational form of Fityan al-Islam: periodic elections, national and local branches, and a written constitution. While not the only one, Fityan al-Islam is the oldest and largest functioning organization formed and led by the Nigerian 'ulamā' along the lines of modern civic associations. Traditional 'ulamā' are also active in other modern Islamic associations, including Jama'at Nasril al-Islam, Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, and Nigerian Council of 'Ulamā.' These associations, markedly different from the Sufi orders, attest to the modernization of the traditionalism of Nigerian 'ulamā—a development reinforced by two other related changes.

Transformation of traditionalism of 'ulamā' is also observable in their increasing discourses on secularity of the Nigerian state, gender equality, human rights, democracy, and rights of ethnic and religious minorities. Nigerian 'ulamā' discuss these issues in daily Islamic broadcasts on the popular Federal Radio Corporation, Kaduna (FRCN), and recorded audio and video cassettes, the marketing of which is now a growth industry. Hausa broadcasts by international media houses, particularly British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Voice of America (VOA), and Deutsche Welle (Voice of Germany), constituted a major source of raising awareness of modern global discourses among Nigerian 'ulamā' long before instantaneous television

coverage of world events.[1] While listening to these broadcasts in the summer and fall of 1999, I noticed that listeners' questions and comments sent in from Nigeria indicated strong interest in current Islamic issues in the United States and Western Europe. I also observed listeners reveal their equally strong interests in the increased controversies surrounding Islam and gender issues, Muslim minority rights, application of Shari'a, and the establishment of an Islamic state in some Muslim countries. Nigerian ʿulamāʾ speak on modern issues in public forums, including Friday sermon in mosques and street preaching. Speeches by the ʿulamāʾ on these occasions are often recorded in audio and video cassettes and sold by street vendors; it is also common to hear these speeches broadcast from loudspeakers of various mosques. By actively participating in modern global discourses rather than confining themselves to arcane religious issues and ancient texts, Nigerian ʿulamāʾ show that their traditionalism is not an anachronism, but a changing orientation fully engaged with topical global issues.

This engagement with modern global discourses is likely to continue in view of generational change. Among others, the deaths of Shaykh Nasir Kabara (1996) and Wazir Junaid of Sokoto (1997) mark the 1990s as a decade of transition. Whereas the old ʿulamāʾ were grounded in traditional Islamic education, the younger ʿulamāʾ are trained in at least two of the following educational systems: traditional Islamic, modern Islamic, and western education up to university level in Nigeria or abroad. This exposure to different educational systems acquaints the younger ʿulamāʾ with modern ideas and institutions; hence, they are likely to continue modernizing the traditionalism of ʿulamā, a development observable in the form, style, and substance of the public roles of the younger ʿulamāʾ (Oseni 1996, 1999; Zahradeen 1999). Many of the younger ʿulamāʾ are the descendents of older ʿulamāʾ serving as khalifas (successors) to their fathers. Not surprisingly, they see themselves not only as heirs to the older ʿulamā, but also as present day spokespersons for Islamic traditionalism. Rather than disputing this self-image, it is more pertinent to regard the emergence of the younger ʿulamāʾ as part of the changes in the traditionalism of the Nigerian ʿulamā.

The changes discussed so far—namely, transformation of Sufi orders, Maitatsine uprisings, formation of civil associations, participation in modern global discourses, and generational change—collectively point to Islamic traditionalism converging toward Islamic modernism, which in turn has been shifting closer toward fundamentalism. These changes alert us to the analytical limitations of these categories for they refer to the changing realities of Islamic movements.

Islamic Modernism

I identify Islamic modernism with a Wahhabi/Salafi revival that emerged in Nigeria in the 1960s. This trend defines itself by uncompromising opposition to Sufi orders, and in this respect, it is comparable to movements

studied by Kaba (1974), Hiskett (1980) and Launay (1982). In 1977, this trend formed a populist association named Jamā'atu Izālat al-Bid'ah wa Iqāmat al-Sunna (Izala for short). It has since spread widely in Nigeria; its influences are felt in Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Ghana and the Sudan (Brenner 1993, Masqueliar 1996). Three features justify characterizing Izala reformism as Islamic modernism: doctrines, organizational format, leadership, and membership.

First, Izala espouses a *salafi* conception of Islam comparable to many Islamic modernists. Muhammad Abduh's reform is, of course, the most famous example of the connection between Islamic modernism and the *salafi* conception of Islam. In addition to the general opposition to Sufism, *salafists* disapprove of "popular Islam" while advocating an Islamic positivist legalism; they also embrace *ijtihād* while rejecting *taqlīd* and *bid'a*.[2] All these central features of the *salafi* conception of Islam are readily discernible in Izala doctrines (Loimeier 1997; Umar and Hunwick 1995). The Wahhabism that Izala openly upholds is, of course, doctrinally identical with salafism. Space will not permit elaboration of the finer points linking the two, but some of the doctrinal components that make both germane to modernist Islam are worth highlighting briefly.

Both Wahhabism and Salafism espouse a legal positivism emphasizing that Islam is nothing more than compliance with the rules of belief and conduct spelled out in the Qur'an and the traditions of Prophet Muhammad. Hodgson (1974) calls this legalistic conception of Islam "Shar'i vision of Islam," and he sees it as quite compatible with modernity. He observes that "an unbiased devotee of Shar'i Islam" can find much to admire in modernity, because "the Sharī'ah had posited egalitarian justice and had presupposed a degree of social mobility, stressing individual responsibility and nuclear family. More than any other great religious tradition, it had catered to bourgeois and mercantile values. It had struggled persistently against any merely customary authority and usage in the name of universal law and the dignity of the individual" (Hodgson 1974[3]: 196). In all these respects, Hodgson sees clear parallels between Islam and the "Great Western Transmutation"—his term for modernity. He even argues "From fairly early in the nineteenth century, in fact, there were to be alert and respected Muslims to declare that the Europeans were leading a better life by Islamic standards than were the Muslim societies themselves" (ibid., 196). Wahhabi/Salafi espousal of this overwhelming emphasis on the centrality of Sharī'ah in Islamic beliefs and practices is comparable to the legal positivism that pervades modernity.

Wahhabi/Salafi opposition to the "superstitious beliefs of popular Islam" ascribing great powers to religious leaders, especially Sufi Shaykhs, can be easily attractive to the rational outlook that is an important characteristic of modernity. Similarly, Wahhabi/Salafi emphasis on textual authority over personal authority of religious leaders and rejection of *taqlīd* in favor of *ijtihād* can readily resonate with the modern preference for bureaucratic rules over charismatic authority and innovation over tradition.

One may also point to Saudi Arabia where official adoption of Wahhabism does not prevent modernizing the country—though conservative opposition has not been lacking. Still, the important point is that many (but not all) doctrines of Wahhabism/Salafism are quite compatible with many (but again not all) important characteristics of modernity.[3] Izala's espousal of Wahhabism/Salafism therefore justifies characterizing Izala as a movement representing Islamic modernism.

Furthermore, Izala's Islamic modernism can also be seen in its organizational format. In contrast to the transformation of the Sufi orders into virtual civic associations under the leadership of traditional ʿulamāʾ, Izala began by adopting a clear modern organizational format, replete with elected officers, a written constitution, and a formal registration as a legal entity. Izala also led the way in establishing clinics and small business, integrating Islamic and modern subjects in its schools, and propagating its tenets through modern media including newspapers, radio, television, audio and video cassettes. Additionally, Izala prides itself for preaching "modern progressive ideas" and attacking "superstitious customs and traditions" (Yandaki 1992). Although traditional ʿulamāʾ have also floated similar associations, modern organizational format permeates Izala's deep structure more thoroughly than the civic associations of the traditional ʿulamāʾ as manifested in the heavy emphasis on bureaucratic procedures in Izala's administrative system.

A third feature of Izala's Islamic modernism is the educational background of its members and leaders. Whereas the ʿulamāʾ championing Islamic traditionalism were educated in traditional tracks of Islamic education, both Abubakar Gumi and Isma'il Idris, the two most influential leaders of Izala, were educated at the Kano School of Arabic Studies—the first modern Islamic school in Northern Nigeria. Izala leads in establishing modern Islamic schools, where most members of Izala receive Islamic education. In fact, a major arena of Izala activities has been these modern Islamic schools (Dikko 1996).

Modern Islamic Education

Izala schools are modeled after the School for Arabic Studies that originated from the Northern Provinces Law School. The British established this school in the early 1930s in order to raise the standard of Arabic fluency and the legal competence of Muslim judges, who until then were educated within the precolonial system of traditional Islamic education. Right from its inception, the Northern Provinces Law School was organized along the lines of the Western school system, with clearly defined syllabi, graded classes, school uniforms, and fixed periods to graduate after satisfactory performance in written examination. These features are notably absent in the Islamic traditional educational system. The formal student-teacher relationship contrasts sharply with the more personal master-disciple relationship that prevails in Islamic traditional education.

Between 1940 and 1945 a new educational policy transformed the school, however. Under the new name of School for Arabic Studies, it was reorganized into two sections. One section uses Arabic as the language of instruction, and offers Islamic Studies and Arabic Language and Literature as major subjects, and English, Arithmetic, General Knowledge, and History as minor subjects. Successful completion of four years of study leads to the award of the Higher Islamic Studies Certificate, which qualifies its recipients for both teaching and judicial careers. The other section uses English as the language of instruction, and offers a five-year course leading to the Teachers' Grade II Certificate, which qualifies its recipients for a teaching career. Unlike other teachers' colleges, the School for Arabic Studies requires students to take Islamic Studies and Arabic in addition to Education, Arithmetic, and English, the required subjects in all teachers' colleges. It should be noted, however, that this system is currently being transformed as part of the implementation of Nigeria's new national policy on education (Raji 1996).

Graduates of Higher Islamic Studies constitute a modern Islamic elite, fluent in Arabic and versed in Islamic studies, with some fluency in English. But graduates of the Teachers' Grade II belong to the western educated elite, with some proficiency in Islamic Studies and Arabic. In the 1950s, graduates of the School for Arabic Studies were among the first Northern Nigerian Muslims to receive modern education up to university level. Given their educational training, graduates of Higher Islamic Studies are more likely to be at home with modernity than the 'ulamā' trained in traditional Islamic education as illustrated by the careers of Gumi (1992) and Idris (Umar 1983).

Some graduates of Izala schools have now completed university education and are in the early stages of their careers, mainly in teaching, judiciary, and leadership of nongovernmental and religious organizations. While supporting the characterization of Izala as representing Islamic modernism, this development also represents a contemporary example of modernizing Islamic education (Lelyveld 1978; Tibawi 1979; Saqib 1983; Talbani 1987). Izala schools represent novel developments in the history of education in Northern Nigeria. Islamic and Western secular education used to exist in two separate institutions, and Muslims have resisted western secular education since it was introduced by the British (Graham 1966; Boyan 1979; Umar 1997). By integrating Islamic and western education, Izala schools have neutralized the longstanding resistance to western education. They are also integrating the Qur'anic schools for basic literacy and the 'Ilm schools for advanced training in Islamic studies.

A notable aspect of Izala schools is their enrollment of Muslim women. Despite deeply engrained patriarchal notions that have for long justified limiting Muslim women's access to Islamic education (Callaway 1987; Coles and Mack 1991; Lawson 1995; Hutson 1999), Izala leads the way in expanding Muslim women's access to Arabic and Islamic learning. Initially, Izala employed male instructors to teach women in adult literacy

classes, and then Izala opened sections for adolescent females to attend the regular course for the Higher Islamic Studies Certificate. Successful completion qualifies the women to teach in Izala and public schools, become preachers, or to study in universities. Izala's initiative in giving Muslim women access to advanced Islamic learning and modern education is the first of its kind in Northern Nigeria.

Izala insists on educating Muslim women over the strenuous opposition of some traditional *'ulamā,'* who argue that mixing the sexes in school contravenes Islamic teaching. For Izala, mixing the sexes is a lesser evil than leaving Muslim women ignorant of Islam—thus re-echoing the argument once advanced by Shaykh Usman dan Fodio. The implications and consequences of women's increased access to Islamic learning are not yet clear. One can surmise that women educated at Izala schools are likely to espouse Izala doctrines and become active members, thus adding a gender aspect in Izala's Islamic modernism.

Since its emergence in the mid-1970s, Izala has developed in many different ways. The founder of the movement, Isma'il Idris (1999), remarks that if one keeps away from Izala activities for a month, one will not be able to catch up with new developments. As *'ulamā'* traditionalism has been changing over the years, so also has the Islamic modernism of Izala been transformed.

Changes in Islamic Modernism of Izala

From its inception, Izala defined itself by rejecting the religious authority of traditional *'ulamā,'* leading to social and political cleavages along sectarian lines. During the Shagari civilian administration of Nigeria's second republic (1979–1983), Izala was a political force to contend with, for its leadership could deliver the block votes of its followers. Since then, factionalism, fatigue, and the prolonged hold of the Nigerian military to power have combined to diminish Izala's initial political momentum. The long-term consequences of Izala activities, however, are now more discernible in the general shift from Izala's initial modernism toward fundamentalism.

Factionalism seems to be foremost among the significant changes that have transformed Izala over the last two decades. Factionalism has been part of the organizational dynamics within Izala, especially during civilian rule of the Shagari regime, when prominent members withdrew or were expelled from the organization over controversies on block voting in elections. Beginning in 1984, a more serious leadership tussle divided Izala into two camps that have also increasingly become irreconcilable doctrinally. A defining doctrine of Izala holds that Sufism is not part of Islam, and therefore adherents of Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya are polytheists. When one faction in the leadership tussle abandoned this doctrine and declared Tijanis and Qadiris true Muslims, the break between the two Izalas was sealed. One faction of Izala remains under the leadership of Shaykh Idris, and adheres to the original Izala view that Sufis are not Muslims. The other faction recognizes the leadership of Izala's national chairman, Alhaji

Musa Maigandu, and believes that Sufis are in fact Muslims. Meanwhile, "Izala under the leadership of the founder, Shaykh Isma'il Idris," as members of this faction prefer to call themselves, continuous to reaffirm loyalty to the founder and his teachings in exclusionary tone more fundamentalist than modernist, especially when denouncing the other faction's rebellion (tawaye) as identical with or worse than Sufism.

This factionalism has created a deep division that came to light when Shaykh Bawa Mai Shinkafa, one of the leading preachers of the breakaway Izala, passed away in November 1999. Many Muslims, especially in Jos where both Mai Shinkafa and Isma'il Idris' resided, were taken aback by Idris' refusal to attend Mai Shinkafa's funeral or even to express condolences to his bereaved family. Shaykh Idris responded that when he lost his own relatives Mai Shinkafa did not condole him and that since he was not a slave of Mai Shinkafa, he did not feel obliged to mourn for him. In contrast, followers of Mai Shinkafa expressed condolences to Shaykh Idris' followers when he passed away in January 2000. Shaykh Idris' refusal to condole Mai Shinkafa's family represents more than personal animosity; it demonstrates severance of all social ties between the two factions. This development shows Isma'il Idris' Izala moving more toward fundamentalism, for breaking all social ties with the out-group is a common feature of fundamentalist movements.

An important aspect of this factionalism also points to a generational change within Izala. Upon completion of their university education in the mid-1990s, the first set of graduates of Izala schools have either joined the Mai Shinkafa faction, or at least publicly identify with its stand. This small group, known as Madinites ('Yan Madina) because many of them studied at the Islamic University in Madina (Saudi Arabia), numbers less than a hundred individuals, mostly in their thirties. They exercise considerable influence—far more than their youth or small number will suggest, however. They teach in the new Islamic schools and also serve as imam (leaders of congregational prayer), an important position of religious, social, and political leadership. In addition to being educated at the Islamic University in Madina (the second holiest city of Islam after Mecca), their Islamic intellectual capital includes more fluency in spoken Arabic, wider exposure to different traditions of Islamic learning, and international contacts fostered at the Islamic University of Madina, where the majority of the students come from other Islamic countries. Clearly, the Madinites constitute a new Muslim elite that could not easily fit within the old Izala structure even though initially trained at Izala schools. They disagree publicly with Shaykh Idris, especially on the Sufi orders. To differentiate itself from the Madinites, Shaykh Idris' faction reiterates his teachings in more militant and fundamentalist fashion.

This shift toward fundamentalism is likely to continue. As factionalism and generational change attract more members to the soft-line positions of the breakaway faction, the original Izala could only keep its distinct identity by reaffirming the original hard-line positions that had earlier

attracted many followers. The Madinites' higher Islamic education is an asset that will allow them now to lead the Islamic modernism Izala used to represent. Attending the Islamic University of Madina plays a crucial role in the emergence of the Madinites as a new Islamic elite, thereby supporting the correlation of educational backgrounds with Islamic trends. As *'ulamā'*s traditionalism shifts toward modernism, Izala's shift from modernism to fundamentalism illustrates once again that these terms do not refer to stable realities. Meanwhile, the movement that used to champion Islamic fundamentalism is also undergoing a major transformation.

Islamic Fundamentalism

Western-educated Muslims seek to enthrone Islamic values in the political processes and governmental institutions of Nigeria. This trend manifests itself in the proliferation of Islamic organizations, Nigerian schools, and Islamist discourses in newspapers and magazines, vernacular publications, and learned journals. Western-educated Muslims also campaign for Nigeria's membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), desecularization of the Nigerian state, and expanding the scope of Shari'a in Nigeria. These issues are widely covered in the relevant literature (Ofonagoro 1978; Umar A. 1980; Sulaiman 1981; Laitin 1982; Nolutshungu 1983; Clarke and Linden 1984; Clarke 1988; Hodgkin 1990); however, the predominance of western educated elite in the leadership and membership of this Islamic trend warrants further examination.

The Muslim Students' Society (MSS) used to be a dormant organization in Nigeria's educational institutions. From the late 1970s members at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, began to radicalize the MSS, holding street demonstrations to support their call for "Islam only," burning copies of the Nigerian constitution to protest the secularity of the Nigerian state, and voicing strong support for the then ongoing Iranian Islamic revolution. These demonstrations are now clearly recognizable as a turning point in Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria.

In addition to vocal opposition to the secularity of the Nigerian State, no other issue preoccupies Nigerian fundamentalists as much as the continuing identification with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Many fundamentalists don the garments of Iranian clerics, distribute Shi'a literature from Iran, including an Iranian monthly Hausa magazine obviously targeted toward a Northern Nigerian readership, publicize Shi'a doctrines in their own publications, and visit Iran. For these reasons, "an Shi'a" (Hausa word for Shi'ites) has become the popular name for Islamic fundamentalists in Nigeria. However, Shaykh Ibrahim El-Zakzaki (1999a), the leader of the "an Shi'a" and the MSS at Ahmadu Bello University in the late 1970s, insists that he and his followers are neither Shi'ite nor "fundamentalists" but simply "the Islamic Movement in Nigeria." By whatever name, El-Zakzaki and his followers do represent an Islamic trend recognizably different from Islamic traditionalism of *'ulamā'* and Islamic modernism of Izala.

El-Zakzaki was active in the MSS "Islam only" demonstrations in Zaria, where he studied Economics at Ahmadu Bello University. He received Islamic training earlier at home and at the Teachers' Grade II section of the School for Arabic Studies. His continuing activism for "Islam only" has earned him thousands of loyal followers, who have occasionally clashed with police and Izala followers. El-Zakzaki and many of his followers have been detained and imprisoned several times on charges of posing a threat to state security by denouncing the Nigerian state as being grounded in a godless system of *kufr* (Free al-Zakzaky 2000).[4] Describing El-Zakzaki as "a veteran protester" who lives under "permanent police surveillance," Falola notes that whenever released from detention or prison, El-Zakzaki has always been received "by welcoming crowds of thousands of his fol-lowers, who included among them university students and lecturers" (Falola 1998: 196). Western-educated Muslims are not the only members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria. Still, the western-educated El-Zakzaki remains the prominent leader of the most formidable Islamic group with "the ability to mobilize in large numbers, sometimes over ten thousand, in a moment's notice" (ibid., 196). The prominence of university students and lecturers in El-Zakzaki's Islamic Movement stands in sharp contrast to the leadership of Islamic traditionalism by ʿulamāʾ and of Islamic modernism by graduates of new Islamic Schools; it also points to the link between western education and Islamic fundamentalism.

The link is discernible not only in the origins of the Islamic Move-ment in student activism, but also in the continuing role of educational institutions as its source of recruiting members and as a major arena of its activities. Also linking the Islamic Movement and western education is the intellectual articulation of its doctrines, especially in the writings of El-Zakzaki, which reveal more familiarity with western intellectual tradi-tions than could be found in either the discourses of ʿulamāʾ or Izala. Before examining these doctrines a brief sketch of the development of western education in Northern Nigeria will be relevant here.

Western Education in Nigeria

As earlier noted, British colonialism introduced western education from the early 1910s to the 1920s. Fearing Islamic opposition, the British introduced secular education instead of Christian missionary education, yet western education was never popular among Muslims (Lugard 1912; Graham 1966). In 1922 the British established the Katsina College as the first western educational institution of "higher learning" that trained the first genera-tion of Muslims to rise to senior positions in the colonial administration. The British also formed the political class that ascended to power after independence in 1960 (Williams and Naibi 1959).

Although the first decade after independence witnessed continued lack of interest in western education, Muslims could no longer ignore its potential as a means to positions of influence. The politics of regionalism and ethnicity led northern Nigerian leaders to introduce scholarships as

incentives to increase school enrollment in order to produce graduates who could compete with the more educated Nigerians from the western and eastern regions. Still, the educational gap continued to widen even after the replacement of the regional system with twelve states in 1967 and the emergence of a stronger federal government with more interest in educational matters.

In order to bridge the continuing educational disparity between northern Nigeria on the one hand, and eastern and western Nigeria on the other hand, the federal government introduced a free and compulsory Universal Primary Education (UPE) in 1975, which was part of a larger new national policy on education that began in the early 1970s. Muslims received the introduction of the UPE with a great deal of skepticism (Clarke and Linden 1984: 150–6). Over the last two decades, many problems have continued to afflict the implementation of the new national policy on education, particularly lack of qualified teachers and poor funding (Fafunwa 1991). The result is the virtual collapse of the Nigerian public educational system.

This unfortunate development dampened the already low enthusiasm for Western education among Muslims, but also coincided with the proliferation of Islamic schools already discussed. With the graduates of these new Islamic schools becoming a new elite, Islamic learning has become valuable cultural capital that could be invested for political gains, most notably in winning the mass support of Muslims toward specific political ends. To compete culturally and politically, western educated Muslims must publicly demonstrate how much Islamic learning they possess. Thus in one of his speeches recorded on audiocassette, Ibrahim El-Zakzaki had to respond to charges that he lacked sufficient Islamic learning. The following section reveals the interesting mixture of Islamic and western intellectual traditions in El-Zakzaki's articulation of the doctrines of his movement.

The Doctrines of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria

At the center of the doctrines of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria is the necessity to struggle and suffer in order to establish an Islamic society and state in Nigeria. El-Zakzaki (1993, 1994, 1999) sees the birth of Nigeria in the crucible of colonial rule as a major obstacle against Islamizing the country. He views the 1914 colonial amalgamation of the predominantly Muslim communities of Northern Nigeria with non-Muslims of the British colonies of Southern and Eastern Nigeria as an elaborate colonial ploy to contaminate the purity of Northern Nigeria's Islamic heritage with paganism, thereby preventing Islam from threatening colonialists' economic interests. He credits the British with conspiring to ensure that their successors in an independent Nigeria will not tamper with political arrangement favorable to colonial interests. Proclaiming a fundamental incompatibility between Islam and paganism, El-Zakzaki sees Nigeria's religious and ethnic pluralism as a fatal birth defect that, unless cured by thoroughly Islamizing state and society, dooms Nigeria to endless social, cultural, economic, and political maladies, adding that any medication other than Islamiza-

tion will always worsen the condition of the long suffering patient. El-Zakzaki's preoccupation with Nigeria's political problems is consistent with the fundamentalist emphasis on state power (Marty and Appleby 1993a; Choueiri 1996). Siddiqi remarks: "The Islamic movement may be defined as the struggle of the Muslims to establish, maintain, develop, defend, extend, or re-establish the Islamic State as an instrument to 'enjoin good and forbid evil' for the welfare and happiness of all mankind in this world and in the Hereafter" (Siddiqi 1981: 7).

The Islamic Movement in Nigeria emphasizes martyrdom as a central doctrine. Martyrdom is supremely desirable because of its enormous rewards including direct admission into paradise. Martyrdom is a necessary part of the struggle to Islamize state and society. El-Zakzaki (undated) identifies three aspects of what he terms the unalterable tradition (*sunnah*) ordained by God for all His prophets: (1) Only the youth and the weak in society readily accept the message of God's prophets; (2) the mighty ones lead the majority in society to oppose God's prophets and their small band of youthful and weak followers; and (3) God causes the two groups to clash, making the prophets and their groups prevail. According to El-Zakzaki, loss of life, including that of prophets, is also an ineluctable feature of each of these three aspects of the correct path prescribed by God for the struggle to Islamize societies, hence his claim that "religion cannot be established without bloodshed" (8). Seventy-nine members of the Islamic Movement have so far been martyred in clashes with police and security agents, Izala followers, and vigilante groups mobilized by communities opposed to the Islamic Movement (Mu'assasatus 1999). In addition to the doctrinal celebration of martyrdom and its enormous rewards in the hereafter, martyrs of the Islamic Movement are also publicly honored in Hausa poems recited at major public events and publicized in the Islamic Movement's Hausa weekly newspaper, *Al-Mizan*. The Islamic Movement has also published a biographical dictionary of its martyrs (Mu'assasatus Shuhada), thus preserving for posterity the names of those who paid the ultimate price with their lives for the Islamic Movement in Nigeria; it has also established a charitable foundation to generate funds for supporting the bereaved families of martyrs. The high value attached to the willingness to die for the cause clearly marks the Islamic Movement in Nigeria as a fundamentalist movement that commands a high level of commitment from its members.

Another important doctrine of the Islamic Movement centers around recruitment and leadership. New members are expected to do three things: (1) Denounce their existing sociopolitical system of *kufr* and sever ties to it (*bara'a*); (2) pledge allegiance to the Islamization cause (*bay'a*); and (3) declare loyalty to the leadership of the Islamic Movement (*wilaya*). Two important aspects of this doctrine of leadership are worth highlighting here. One aspect seeks to identify El-Zakzaki with the legacy of Shaykh Usman ɗan Fodio by emphasizing that El-Zakzaki answers ɗan Fodio's description of a leader who will appear and take on the role of the "Assistant to the Mahdi" (Mataimakin Mahdi). The other aspect identifies the "Mahdi" to

be assisted by El-Zakzaki with the expected Mahdi of the Twelve Shi'a (Saulawa 1997). Similarly, *Al-Mizan* commonly carries stories of El-Zakzaki publicly accepting pledges of loyalty from large crowds. It is pertinent to note that the triple doctrine of *barā'a, bay'a,* and *wilāya* comes from classical Shi'a doctrines of the imamate (Momen 1985: 147–160), thus justifying the common perception of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria as an Shi'a despite the protestation of El-Zakzaki to the contrary. But the more relevant conclusion here is that El-Zakzaki's leadership is taking on the attributes of a maximum leader common among fundamentalist movements.

The Islamic Movement is critical of what it regards as unnecessary quarrels over trivial points between Izala preachers and traditional *'ulamā.* It embraces many Shi'a doctrines though without accepting the label, but Izala regards Shi'ism as un-Islamic, hence the clashes between followers of Izala and Islamic Movements. Similarly, doctrinal disagreements with traditional *'ulamā'* sometime lead to clashes, especially when the Islamic Movement denounces nonmembers in Qur'anic tropes such as *tughyān* (transgression), *tāghut,* and *zulm* (injustice) that threaten divine chastisement for those unwilling to resist injustice.

Changes in the Activism of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria   The most notable change has been the transformation from student activism to a mass movement attracting members from the general public. Its origins in the Nigerian institutions of higher learning, however, still influence the movement toward an intellectualist orientation especially in the articulation of its doctrines. It still draws membership from schools, where its leaders are also frequent visitors and speakers. The continuing connections to educational institutions are also demonstrated in *Tanscampus,* an Islamic Movement newsletter dedicated to students' issues. Still, the Islamic Movement is no longer a purely student movement, for it is also active in the public square and draws membership from the general public as well.

Activities of the Islamic Movement used to comprise lectures, discussions, students' demonstrations, and the annual Islamic vocational course organized by the Muslim Students Society in schools. Nowadays, these activities occur equally in mosques, town centers, stadiums, and the Islamic Movement's buildings. A prominent activity is the observance of days designated for commemorating special events, such as Fatimah Day and Qudus Day. On such days, members demonstrate in long processions with some members dressed in particular garments and carrying placards with slogans for the event of the day. These processions, which occur in cities and towns where the Islamic Movement has a significant presence and is widely covered in the press, illustrate clearly the shift from student activism to mass movement.

Mosques, including the Friday central mosque, are major arenas for the Islamic Movement's preaching, group discussions, and distribution of publications. Clashes in mosques have occurred between the Islamic Movement and its opponents, leading authorities to require permits to preach

in Friday mosques. The Islamic Movement does not seek such permits, however, arguing that God has already permitted it to preach. Calling police to prevent its preaching confirms the Islamic Movement's perception of the police as brutal agents of the anti-Islamic system of *kufr*. Staging activities in Friday central mosques helps the Islamic Movement attract the attention of the Muslim public at large, rather than confining its message to students only.

Other activities appealing to a broader Muslim audience include wedding and naming ceremonies, and fundraisers to support various programs such as building centers and schools. A notable feature of these events is the recitation of Hausa poems popularizing the cause of the Islamic Movement. This is consistent with the old tradition of using Hausa poems to advocate positions on public issues. The Islamic Movement seems to have found such an effective campaign instrument in Hausa poems that it organizes periodic competition among its Hausa poets, with the winning entries appearing in its publications. While English is the language of the elite, Hausa is lingua franca of the masses; hence, utilizing Hausa poems to popularize its activities points to the Islamic Movement in Nigeria shifting from a student's movement to a mass movement.

There are other less clear-cut but still discernible changes. When the Islamic Movement supported the then ongoing Iranian revolution in the late 1970s, it was not out of attraction to Shi'a doctrines but to the triumph of Islamic radicalism over the Shah's regime and his western supporters. Since then, the Islamic Movement has steadily embraced Shi'a doctrines, symbolism, and identity in unmistakable ways, leading to criticism that Shi'ism is being smuggled into the Islamic Movement. Despite El-Zakzaki's objections, the observable shift toward Shi'ism is a major change in the character, orientation, and activities of the Islamic Movement. Criticism against that development could also lead to factionalism. It remains to be seen in what directions these incipient developments will unfold.

Conclusions

The central thesis of this essay is that three identifiable Islamic trends can each be correlated to a particular educational background, a point only implicitly alluded to in the literature (Lubeck 1985; Winters 1987; Hodgkin 1990). On the surface, it is self-evident that different types of education should dispose individuals toward particular worldviews. What seems counterintuitive, however, is that Islamic fundamentalism attracts more western-educated Muslims than Muslims with either a traditional Islamic education or modern Islamic education. This phenomenon has also been observed in a number of Islamic societies including Egypt (Ibrahim 1988) and the Gulf States (Eickelman 1992). Similarly, Marty and Appleby (1993) conclude that "schools, day care centers, seminaries and colleges are the local chapters of fundamentalist movements," and that reclaiming

control of the family, media and educational institutions has been one of the "most impressive results of fundamentalist efforts at any level and, in terms of long-term impact, likely the most important" (Marty and Appleby 1993b: 11). Clearly then, the connection between western education and Islamic fundamentalism in Northern Nigeria is consistent with a global trend.

A plausible explanation points to the decline of western education in the context of deteriorating economic fortunes induced by the global shift toward deregulation, restructuring, and downsizing in the private sector, and cutback in government spending on social services. This explanation seems to be particularly applicable to Nigeria, where the implementation of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund structural adjustment program (SAP) combined with the legendary corruption of military regimes to impoverish millions of Nigerians. Yet even so, ordinary Nigerians most negatively affected by the structural adjustment program are not as much attracted to fundamentalism as the relatively better off western-educated elite.

An alternative explanation accounts for the attraction of the educated elite toward religious fundamentalism in terms of a reassertion of local cultural identity in response to the "end of history" resulting from the global triumph of the western way of life. Variations of this explanation include theories of "clash of civilization," "discontent with modernity," and "loss of faith in secular ideologies." However, while reassertion of cultural identity is not entirely missing in fundamentalist discourses in Nigeria, the impact of western culture on Muslims of Northern Nigeria has not been all that pervasive, hence the cultural identity explanation seems far fetched.

A more down-to-earth explanation seems to give more insight into the attraction of western-educated Muslims to fundamentalism in Northern Nigeria. Over two decades of active mobilizing, organizing, and preaching by Izala have significantly raised Islamic consciousness in Nigeria to saturate the public sphere, so much so that nothing could gain public legitimacy without recourse to Islam—a development comparable to what Gehad (1994) terms "normalization of the Islamic movement in Egypt." In this context, Islamic credentials seem to be the only viable capital in the political, social, cultural, and economic arena. To succeed in any one of these arenas, one has to possess sufficient Islamic credentials. Given the longstanding suspicion and resistance against western education in Northern Nigeria, western-educated Muslims must demonstrate their Islamic credentials more emphatically to compensate for the perceived deficiency resulting from their educational background. By embracing Islamic fundamentalism, western-educated Muslims equip themselves with the necessary Islamic capital to compete culturally, socially, politically, and economically against Muslim elite trained in modern and traditional Islamic schools.

The Islamic saturation of the public sphere helps to explain recent initiatives to implement the "full Sharia" in Nigeria. When western-educated Muslim politicians began the program, both traditional *'ulamā'* and Izala Islamic modernists were caught off guard, for neither of them thought implementing "full Sharia" was possible in the multireligious society of the secular state of Nigeria. Given the enormous popular support, however, even traditionalists and modernists who had publicly stated that "full Sharia" was not feasible were quick to identify with the program. An ironic twist comes from al-Zakzaki's stand that the implementation of "full Shari'a" should come only after state and society have been fully Islamized. The many interesting issues in the current politics of implementing the "full Sharia" in the context of Nigeria's return to democracy, and their implications for each Islamic trend cannot be fully explored here. Hopefully, this essay provides the broad context for further examination of those issues and their implications.

By highlighting changes in "Islamic traditionalism," "Islamic modernism," and "Islamic fundamentalism," this essay calls attention to the problem of using these terms as analytical categories. The vast literature on Islamic movements, particularly since the Iranian revolution, is permeated with various labels purporting to classify and differentiate Islamic trends. Scholars disagree on which label best describes a particular Islamic movement (Danner 1980; Nasr 1980; Voll 1994; Gerholm 1997), though "Islamism" and "fundamentalism" seem to have gained wider currency lately. While these terms are handy for identifying and classifying observable differences, they could also easily erase subtle linkages, nuances, and changes, particularly when polemically used to highlight deficiency rather than difference.[5] Thus, in addition to the failure to capture the changing realities of the movements to which these terms ostensibly refer (as demonstrated in this essay), the terms may also function discursively, carrying loaded significations that many authors might wish to avoid, hence the need for caution and clarification.

NOTES

1. Hausa programs of these international media houses are enormously popular not only in Northern Nigeria but also in all the Hausa-speaking communities across West Africa. These programs are becoming increasingly important political arenas for Hausa speaking communities, as can be seen in the official web page of the Voice of America *http://www.voa.gov/hausa/* (Accessed on 1 April 2000).

2. These terms represent important issues in the modernization of Islamic law. *Ijtihad* means the authority to form an independent interpretation of Islamic scriptures on point of law, which is often embraced by Islamic modernists, while *taqlid* means the opposite of *ijtihad*, i.e., following established rules of Islamic law rather than seeking to accommodate Islamic law to modern conditions; hence, *taqlid* is embraced by opponents of Islamic modernists. Meaning "innovation" literally, *bid'a* has negative theological significations when used to describe "new" religious beliefs and practices.

3. Since there are many conceptions of modernity, it is pertinent to clarify my usage of the term here. I understand *modernity* as a condition of human existence characterized by, among other things, a rejection of *past* beliefs and practices about society, politics, economy, intellectual and religious domains. I see as an important feature of modernity the acceptance of continuous innovation, and emphasis on specialized technical consideration over and above every other consideration. *Modernization* is the process of bringing about modernity, while modernism is an attitude or conviction that is supportive of modernity. *Modern* is simply an adjective that describes modernity. Modern and Western are often used as if the two are synonymous, but although related, they are not the same thing: Western is more geographically limited while *modern* is more historically limited. I derived the various elements of this conception of modernity largely from Hodgson (1974) and Rippin (1993).

4. The web page for the "Free al-Zakzaky Campaign" lists 232 names of al-Zakzaky's followers "detained without charge or sentenced without proper trial since 12.9.96."

5. This point was repeatedly emphasized to me during fieldwork in Nigeria. It is only with grave reservations and lack of a handy substitute that I continue to use to these terms.

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